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A Method for Modeling Low-Probability, High-
Consequence Risk Events: Vessel Traffic on the Lower 
Mississippi River 
GEORGE WOODDELL, ROBERT GRAMLING, CRAIG J. FORSYTH* 
INTRODUCTION 
On the afternoon of December 14, 1996, the motor vessel Bright Field, 
a 763 foot long, Liberian flagged, dry cargo carrier, was descending the 
Mississippi River passing under the Greater New Orleans Bridge and ap-
proaching the sharp right hand turn around Algiers Point.  At 2:06 pm, she 
lost power and, since rudders on motor vessels steer almost entirely by 
deflecting prop wash, also lost steerage.  The vessel was traveling at six-
teen miles per hour and immediately began to drift toward the outside of 
the turn.  Ultimately the Bright Field struck the New Orleans “River 
Walk,” a densely populated tourist location, between two moored and oc-
cupied cruise vessels on one side and a gambling boat with approximately 
800 people on-board on the other.  The allision1 destroyed a portion of the 
River Walk and badly damaged a number of shops and a portion of the 
New Orleans Hilton.  The good news is that the Bright Field was loaded 
with corn instead of a more hazardous cargo and missed the nearby vessels 
loaded with people.   No one died, but 116 people sustained injuries.  
Damages and losses have been estimated at half a billion dollars.  The bad 
news is that similar sized ships carrying potentially volatile cargos (gaso-
line, liquid natural gas, ammonium nitrate) pass through the same route on 
a daily, sometimes hourly, basis.   
A variety of commodities, from chlorine to corn and petroleum to pas-
sengers, are transported on the lower Mississippi River regularly.  Corn, 
  
 * George Wooddell is an Assistant Professor of Sociology at the University of Louisiana at Lafay-
ette.  He received his Ph.D. from Louisiana State University in 1999.  His research interests are in 
environmental sociology.  Professor Wooddell may be reached at wooddell@louisiana.edu. Robert 
Gramling is Department Head and Professor of Sociology at the University of Louisiana at Lafayette.  
His principal research interests are in the area of environmental sociology and social impact assess-
ment.  He received his Ph.D. from Florida State University in 1975.  Prof. Gramling may be reached at 
gramling@louisiana.edu. Craig J. Forsyth is the Head of the Department of Criminal Justice and Pro-
fessor of Sociology at the University of Louisiana at Lafayette.  He received his Ph.D. from Louisiana 
State University in 1983.  His principal research interests are in the areas of crime and deviance. Prof. 
Forsyth may be reached at cjf5714@louisiana.edu.  
 1. An “allision” is when a vessel strikes anything but another vessel also under way (a collision) or 
the bottom (a grounding). 
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wheat and coal are the most commonly carried commodities.  From a hu-
man health and safety perspective, these are relatively benign products in 
that a vessel accident and spill of these are not directly hazardous to peo-
ple, whatever other ecological disturbances may ensue.  However, over 
eighty million tons of petroleum products are transported on the river an-
nually.  Over a million tons of liquid natural gas traverse the river through 
the center of New Orleans.  Additionally, over 400,000 tons of ammonium 
nitrate2 pass through the center of Baton Rouge annually.  The potential for 
a technological disaster is certainly present. 
In his chapter on marine accidents, Charles Perrow calls marine trans-
portation an “error-inducing” system.3  A variety of factors lead to this 
designation, including: language differences between officers, crews and 
pilots;4 intense pressure on captains to meet (often unrealistic) schedules;5 
avoidance of realistic inspection procedures by registering vessels in coun-
tries that do not require them, i.e., flags of convenience;6 fragmented 
managerial regimes (ship owned by a company in one country; registered 
in a second country and leased by a company in a third country);7 lack of 
vessel control systems, such as those for air traffic;8 and, also unlike air-
lines, few high status passengers to call attention to accidents.  More re-
cently, the transformation of the only federal authority with any real en-
forcement power, the Coast Guard, to a drug interdiction agenda, is proba-
bly also a factor. 
Anyone who studies technological disasters knows that the best way to 
deal with them is to prevent them from happening in the first place.  But to 
do this requires identification and modeling of the factors that cause them.  
The biggest impediment to this step is lack of data as Robert Gramling and 
Naomi Krogman (among others) have noted.  
Regulatory agencies generally purport to base their preventative 
measures on scientific evidence of risk.  While some technological 
processes or activities may be subject to formal risk analysis, low 
  
 2. In mid April 1947, a ship loaded with ammonium nitrate (fertilizer as in Oklahoma bomber 
Timothy McVeigh’s bomb) exploded at the dock in Texas City, Texas, killing 576, injuring 5,000 and 
causing $67 million in property damage. 
 3. Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technology 172 (Princeton Univer-
sity Press 1984). 
 4. Allision of the Liberian Freighter Bright Field with the Poydras Street Warf, Riverwalk Market-
place, and New Orleans Hilton Hotel in New Orleans Louisiana December 14, 1996  (National Trans-
portation Safety Board 1998). 
 5. Perrow, supra n. 3, at 179-184. 
 6. K. X. Li & J. Wonham, Who Is Safe and Who Is at Risk:  A Study of 20-Year-Record on Acci-
dent Total Loss in Different Flags, 26:2 Mar. Policy and Mgt. 137 (1999). 
 7. Perrow, supra n. 3, at 170-231. 
 8. Id. 
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incidence, high consequence events such as technological acci-
dents are extremely difficult to predict with any accuracy…little 
more than educated guesses.  . . . One of the most significant prob-
lems with assessing the risk of a major incident is that these low-
probability events provide few examples from which to extrapolate 
risk factors. . . . Waiting for a sufficient number of oil spills, toxic 
chemical leaks or refinery explosions is not, however, a reasonable 
tactic in the prevention of these high consequence events.9 
Thus, the question becomes: In the absence of sufficient direct experi-
ence, are there data that can help us begin to address the causes of and pre-
dict these low-probability, high-consequence events?  James March sug-
gests that maximum information can be extracted from low-probability, 
high-consequence events through: (1) collecting rich histories of events; 
(2) using multiple observers and multiple interpretations of events; and (3) 
constructing hypothetical histories.10  This paper provides an example of 
how, using the first two of these techniques, data collected from expert 
informants and inferences from existing data on both low-incidence serious 
accidents and more common less serious accidents can be used to construct 
an index of relative risk.  The model focuses on vessel traffic traveling on 
the lower Mississippi River, the busiest waterway in the world, where over 
350,000 recorded commercial vessel movements occur annually.11  
The vast majority of the literature relevant to the question of vessel ac-
cident risk concerns  the question of on-board causes of vessel accidents.  
It is assumed that the predictors of which vessel will have an accident are 
on-board the vessel (i.e., vessel and crew characteristics).  The most com-
monly cited on-board hazards include: the size of the vessel; the age of the 
vessel; the length of the vessel; whether the vessel is single or double 
hulled; the maintenance of the vessel; the classification society under 
which the vessel is registered;12 the type of ownership; the history of own-
ership; where the vessel is flagged (i.e., flag of convenience or traditional 
maritime nation); license qualifications of mates and engineers; the ves-
sel’s casualty history; the vessel’s history of violations; whether the vessel 
has system (e.g., steering) redundancy; and personnel history (including 
  
 9. Robert Gramling & Naomi Krogman, Communities, Policy and Chronic Technological Disas-
ters, 45 Current Sociology 41, 46 (1997). 
 10. James March, A Primer on Decision Making: How Decisions Happen 242-243 (Free Press 
1994). 
 11. A “vessel movement” is defined as the trip between the loading of a single commodity and its 
offloading.  Boats that do not have cargo, such as a tug boat that moves to assist a ship docking, are not 
recorded. 
 12. A “classification society” certifies that a vessel is seaworthy.  While some classification socie-
ties are reputable, others are merely rubber stamps.  Shipping interests are well aware of the integrity of 
the various classification societies. 
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manning levels and the comparison of the present levels of manning with 
that of the vessel in the past and with similar type vessels).13  
Unfortunately, while experts on marine accidents are virtually unani-
mous in their assessment that vessels flying flags of convenience are more 
likely to be involved in accidents, or that ships with redundant systems are 
safer than those without, the data to test these assumptions usually do not 
exist.  The fact of the matter is that data are not collected in such a fashion 
as to enable one to relate accidents to these on-board characteristics.  In 
those few cases where accidents are serious enough to require an investiga-
tion, by the Coast Guard or the National Transportation Safety Board, 
these factors are noted only if they were assessed as contributors to the 
accident.  This fact returns us to the same problem noted above, of too few 
cases from which to generalize.  In addition, factors that were not pre-
sumed to be contributors to the accident are not noted, even if they are 
thought to be dangerous by experts.  Finally, in order to know if an on-
board characteristic raised the vessel’s probability of accident, one would 
have to know how many miles the vessel traveled per accident.  The actual 
history-of-vessel data required are proprietary and not released.  Thus, for 
the present, hypotheses about onboard vessel characteristics cannot be 
tested.   
Craig Forsyth, Robert Gramling and George Wooddell, have addressed 
a different question: Where will vessels have accidents?14 These authors 
  
 13. Spill, The Wreck of the Exxon Valdez:  Implications for Safe Marine Transportation (Alaska Oil 
Spill Commission 1990); Report of the Tanker Safety Study Group (Alaska Oil Spill Commission 
1989); Report of the Tanker Safety Study Group (United States Coast Guard 1987); Investigating 
Human Factors in Marine Casualities (The Tavistock Institute of Human Relations; Center for Marine 
Conservation 1989);  The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill:  A Management Analysis (Center for Marine Con-
servation 1989); Craig Forsyth, Sea Daddy:  An Excursus Into an Endangered Social Species, 13 Mar. 
Policy and Mgt. 53 (1986);  Craig Forsyth, The American Merchant Seaman and His Industry:  Strug-
gle and Stigma (Taylor & Francis 1989); Craig Forsyth, The Future of the American Seaman, 17 Mar. 
Policy and Mgt. 249 (1990);  Craig Forsyth,  Factors Affecting Tanker Safety, 18 Mar. Policy and Mgt. 
313 (1991); Craig Forsyth, Transnational Corporations: Problems for Study in the New International 
Order of Maritime Shipping, 20(3) Mar. Policy and Mgt. 207 (1993); Craig Forsyth & William Bank-
ston , The Social Psychological Consequence of a Life at Sea:  A Causal Model, 11 Mar. Policy and 
Mgt. 123 (1984); Barbara Herman, Screening for Acceptable Risk:  Washington State’s Program for 
Screening Cargo and Passenger Vessels (Office of Marine Safety 1994); The Parameters of the Psycho-
logical Autonomy of Industrial Trawler Crews, in Seafarer and Community: Towards a Social Under-
standing of Seafaring (P. Fricke ed., Rowman & Littlefield 1973);   A Study of Human Resources in 
Ship Operations Phase 2 (Maritime Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce 1982);  National 
Research Council, Research Need to Reduce Maritime Collisions, Rammings and Groundings (Na-
tional Maritime Transportation Research Board, Academy Press 1981); Final Report, (States/British 
Columbia Oil Spill Task Force Olympia WA 1990); The Oil Pollution Act, H.R. Rpt. 3394 (1989); C. 
Whitehurst, U.S. Merchant Marine (Naval Institute Press 1983). 
 14. Craig Forsyth et al., Modeling the Mississippi: Oil Spill Risk on Louisiana’s Largest Waterway, 
(Louisiana Oil Spill Research and Development Program 1996) [hereinafter Oil Spill]; Robert Gram-
ling et al., Modeling the Mississippi: Barge Traffic and the Transportation of Oil on Louisiana’s Larg-
est Waterway (Louisiana Applied Oil Spill Research and Development Program 1998) [hereinafter 
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have developed hypotheses about the effects of known waterway charac-
teristics on the spatial distribution of vessel accidents.  It is the purpose of 
this research to test hypotheses about this second question; to test a risk 
index.  Although the data are limited on major incidents and therefore do 
not provide enough examples from which to extrapolate risk factors from 
major incidents alone, it is reasonable to assume that the causes of minor 
accidents are also potential causes of major accidents.  Had the same set of 
circumstances reported on the Bright Field happened in a different section 
of the river, the vessel might have hit a soft bank, extricated herself and 
continued.  There would have been no National Transportation Safety 
Board investigation, but the pilot would have reported the incident and the 
location.  Similarly, the cause of a grain barge allision might also cause a 
much more hazardous chlorine barge allision.  The factors might be the 
same, but the direct effect on humans might be quite different.  Accord-
ingly, we will focus on the river characteristics presumed to be related to 
accidents in general under the assumption that when river conditions pro-
mote accidents – they do not discriminate in terms of potential damage.  
RIVER RISKS 
A relative risk index, in which each mile of the lower Mississippi 
River is assigned a risk rating relative to every other river mile, was devel-
oped by the authors.15  Those data comprise the independent variables in 
the current research.  The index was constructed from several sources.  
Interviews were conducted with seamen, river pilots, Coast Guard officials, 
National Transportation Safety Board officials, port authorities, and other 
experts to obtain information about hazards on the Mississippi River.   Our 
initial interview was with two river pilots who had a combined experience 
of about thirty-five years.  In our interview with these river pilots, we 
marked specific problems that they noted directly onto United States Corps 
of Engineers chart books for the Mississippi River.  They spent several 
hours taking us, chart by chart, up the river from the mouth of Southwest 
Pass to Baton Rouge, marking the problems and discussing them.  From 
this initial interview, factors believed to increase risk emerged.  Interviews 
with other knowledgeable individuals added to this list.  In general, there 
was a great deal of agreement that these factors were the ones that indi-
viduals who worked on the river were concerned about.   Additional 
sources such as the risk literature and previous attempts at risk indices, 
  
Barge Traffic]; Robert Gramling et al., Expert Informants and Relative Risk: A Methodology for Mod-
eling Waterways, 18 Risk Analysis 557 (1998) [hereinafter Expert Informants]. 
 15. Oil Spill, supra n. 14; Barge Traffic, supra n. 14; Expert Informants, supra n. 14. 
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Workboat Magazine, Coast Guard publications, and commerce statistics 
were reviewed.  Eventually fourteen risk factors were identified: (1) a nar-
row channel; (2) blind turns; (3) dangerous docks; (4) anchorages; (5) 
floating anchorages; (6) barge fleeting areas;16 (7) bridges; (8) waterway 
junctions; (9) channel crossings; (10) shallow channels; (11) ferry cross-
ings; (12) dangerous currents; (13) night vision problems; and (14) conges-
tion.  
The specified hazards. 
1. Narrow Channel. A narrow channel is obviously a place where 
the navigable portion of the river is not wide enough to be en-
tirely safe under all conditions (such as when passing another 
vessel).  The width of a river is determined largely by human 
activity (i.e., structures along the bank that make the river nar-
row). 
2. Blind Turn. A sharp bend where even at the relatively slow 
speeds of waterborne traffic, one cannot see far enough ahead 
to safely respond to other traffic and river characteristics.  
Blind turns were the factor most noted by our informants. 
3. Dangerous Docks.  Dangerous docks are docks that, for a vari-
ety of reasons, informants say are difficult to navigate. They 
may be very busy or extend into the river at a point where one 
has just encountered another hazard (such as a blind turn). 
4. Anchorage. Anchorages are designated places where ships ride 
at anchor waiting for dock space.  The presence of other ves-
sels temporarily narrows the river.  
5. Floating Anchorage. These are buoys permanently moored in 
the River that ships tie up to for loading and unloading  
6. Fleeting Areas.  Fleeting areas are where barges are stored 
when not in use.  When barges are tied together in huge 
moored rafts, they can constitute an obstacle to other naviga-
tion.  These are also areas for frequent activity and vessel 
movement as barge tows are put together for travel up or down 
the river.  
7. Bridges. Bridges narrow the useable waterway and so consti-
tute a hazard to navigation. 
8. Waterway Junction.  A waterway junction is where one wa-
terway joins another.  As with intersections on the highway 
waterway junctions can be problematic. 
  
 16. Fleeting areas are where barge tows are frequently being put together to go up or down stream. 
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9. Channel Crossing.  At various points along the river, the chan-
nel crosses from one side of the River to the other.  Ships must 
follow the channel.  Barges do not.  Therefore, at these channel 
crossings, ship traffic crosses barge traffic. 
10. Shallow Channel.  If a ship drags bottom or has less than a me-
ter clearance, steerage becomes a problem and greatly in-
creases the chances of a mishap. 
11. Ferry Crossing.  Vessels whose routes carry them across rather 
than up or down the river should have a similar effect upon 
navigation as waterway junctions. Thus, ferry crossings are 
also potentially hazardous. 
12. Dangerous Currents.  On the outside of turns the current 
speeds up.  In addition, other factors such as changes in river 
depth may produce large swirling eddies in the river.  These 
situations affect steering. 
13. Night Vision Problems.  Blinding lights at docks and total 
darkness are the most commonly mentioned night vision prob-
lems. 
14. Congestion.  Congestion on the river operates much the same 
as congestion on the highway.  All things being equal, it is 
more difficult to navigate a crowded waterway than an empty 
one. 
 
Having delineated a set of risk factors, the next step was to determine 
where these factors occurred on the river.  Some of these factors are quite 
easy to identify.  Blind (sharp) turns, bridges, anchorages, channel cross-
ings, waterway junctions and ferry crossings are marked on charts and 
maps, but others such as barge fleeting areas and night vision problems are 
not.  The investigators drove to the levees for most of the area under con-
sideration.  We also used satellite photography and a video taken from a 
helicopter that flew down the east bank of the river from Baton Rouge to 
the mouth of Southwest Pass and back up the west bank.17 Piloting charts 
of the River were taken to all informant interviews and every mile on the 
charts was labeled with notes.  These were then arranged into the fourteen 
categories of hazards, such as “blind turn,” “waterway junction,” “danger-
ous current,” and so on.  All were entered into a table where each row was 
a river mile and each category of hazard was a column.  If there was a wa-
terway junction at mile ninety four, then the cell at that location received a 
  
 17. The video was shot the year before our research in an attempt to locate abandoned barges. 
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“1,” and so on for each mile by each hazard column.  Thus, all the river 
hazards so generated are dichotomous, present or absent (1s or 0s). 
 
Figure 1: Lower Mississippi River Port Complex 
 
We focused our model on a 255 mile section of the Mississippi River 
between the mouth of Southwest Pass18 and the U.S. Highway 190 bridge 
at Baton Rouge, which is too low for ships to pass under and thus consti-
tutes the head of deep-water navigation.  New Orleans is at about the mid-
dle of this section.  This is the only section of the river which has both ship 
and barge traffic.  There are four major ports located along this section of 
the river: the Port of South Louisiana (which is the largest, in terms of vol-
ume, in the U.S.); the Port of New Orleans; the Port of Baton Rouge; and 
the Port of Plaquemines.  Taken together, over 400 million tons of cargo 
pass through these ports annually (see Figure 1). 
  
 18. The vast majority of the vessels enter or leave at Southwest Pass.  Southwest Pass is the only 
pass maintained deep enough for ship traffic. 
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In order to test the effect of river traffic on accidents and construct ac-
cident rates of various kinds for use as dependent variables, measures of 
traffic per river mile are necessary.  We obtained traffic data, which listed 
every commercial vessel movement for the year 1995 including the loca-
tion of the vessel at the beginning and end of each trip.19 There are over 
350,000 cases in this database.  Since some of the vessels that entered (or 
exited) the river were loaded (or unloaded) elsewhere, the place where they 
entered (or exited) the river was calculated using some likely assumptions.  
Ships must enter and exit via Southwest Pass.  Barges enter via one of 
seven waterway junctions, Southwest Pass, or by coming downstream and 
passing under the Highway 190 bridge.  Their loading (or unloading) loca-
tion is known.  The junction they entered (or left) is so indicated.   
For example, barges loaded in St. Louis came downstream entering the 
section of the Lower Mississippi River we are studying at mile 233.  
Barges unloaded in Lake Borgne exited at the Mississippi River Gulf Out-
let, and so on.  These data were used in a computation that constructed 255 
dummy variables (one for each river mile), where each vessel movement 
was a case (row).  Judging from loading and unloading points, vessels ei-
ther passed through a mile (a one (1) in that mile’s column) or not (a zero 
(0) in that mile’s column).  Aggregation on vessel type (barge or ship, 
tanker or dry-cargo, all vessels) then produced the sum of all vessels pass-
ing through a river mile in 1995, by type of vessel.  The resulting file was 
then transposed (changing the mile variables into cases of miles) and was 
merged with the risk factor table adding four new variables to it (number 
of tanker barges, number of dry-cargo barges, number of tanker ships and 
number of dry-cargo ships) to be used in the traffic rate calculations (ex-
plained immediately below), and one new variable (total traffic) to be used 
in some models as an independent variable and to calculate all-accident 
rates. 
ACCIDENTS AND ACCIDENT RATES 
The dependent variables in this investigation are various categories of 
vessel accident rates.  The accident data were obtained from the U.S. Coast 
Guard.20  Every vessel accident that the Coast Guard investigates is entered 
as a case.  One of the variables in the data set specifies the river mile of the 
accident.  Categories of vessel type (barge or ship, tanker or dry-cargo) and 
  
 19. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Proprietary Individual Vessel Movements (1995) (not pub-
lished). 
 20. National Technology Information Service, Marine Casualty and Pollution Database (U.S. Coast 
Guard 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997).   
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type of accident (allision, collision, or grounding) were aggregated by river 
mile and merged with the database of hazards.  A few definitions:  
• Allisions: accidents in which a vessel hits anything but the bot-
tom or another vessel that is underway.  If a vessel underway 
hits a vessel that is not underway, that too is an allision. 
• Collisions: accidents in which one vessel underway hits an-
other vessel underway. 
• Groundings: accidents in which a vessel enters waters that are 
too shallow for the vessel’s draft, and “runs aground.”  Typi-
cally “bump and run” groundings, when a vessel is off the 
ground within a half hour or so under its own power, are not 
reported.   
 
We also have an “all-accidents” figure, which includes categories of 
accidents other than allisions, collisions and groundings (such as explo-
sions, equipment failures, and so on).  The all-accidents variable also in-
cludes other vessels (such as party boats and casinos), in addition to the 
four types noted above (tanker barges, dry cargo barge, tanker ship, dry-
cargo ship).  The all-accidents figure, therefore, is higher than the sum of 
the accident types or the sum of accidents occurring to the four vessel 
types. 
The models in this research, however, use accident rates, not raw acci-
dents as the dependent variable. These were constructed as the number of 
accidents (by category) in a mile during the reporting period, divided by 
the number of vessels (by category) to pass the mile in 1995 multiplied by 
100,000 (to avoid excessive decimal places).  
Aggregation of the accident database yields the number of various 
types of accidents that occurred in each river mile in the years 1992 
through 1997.  Allision, collision and grounding rates are calculated from 
the Coast Guard accident data using Corps of Engineers traffic data as: 
 
(Accident type / total traffic) * 100,000 = Accident Type Rate 
 
Accident rates occurring to the various vessel types are calculated as: 
 
(Accidents involving vessel type / that type of vessel traffic) * 
100,000 = Vessel Type Accident Rate 
Population Density 
Since ultimately we want to discover the risk to human populations 
along the river, the units of analysis (miles along the river) are weighted by 
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population density.  Population density is calculated by taking the number 
of persons in all census block groups within a half mile of the River,21 and 
dividing that number by the number of square kilometers of dry land in 
those block groups,22 for each of the 255 river miles.  
The final database then has 255 cases of miles, navigational character-
istics of each mile (the fourteen risk factors identified), vessel traffic for 
each mile, population densities for each mile, and categories of vessel ac-
cident rates for each mile.   
MODELING THE RIVER 
Predicting the combined effect of the hazards to navigation on acci-
dents is accomplished by multiple regression (ordinary least squares).  Or-
dinary least squares necessitate certain statistical assumptions.  One of 
those assumptions is that the independent variables are not so highly inter-
correlated that they are statistically indistinguishable.   
Some of the independent variables in these regressions are correlated, a 
condition known as colinearity. (See Table 1). Multicolinearity occurs 
when independent variables are explained by other independent variables 
as a group.  In a multiple regression, multicolinearity can cause unexpect-
edly large or small effects, or change the apparent direction of effects.  
Results for a regression with multicolinearity problems are not reliable, 
and some correction must be made.  Problems with multicolinearity were 
diagnosed with the Tolerance statistic and independent variables were re-
moved to decrease Tolerance to below 0.5.  In the tables, variables that 













 21. U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of the Census, Twenty-first Census of the U.S.: 
Characteristics of the Population (Government Printing Office 1990). 
 22. Id. 
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Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
FINDINGS 
The list of delineated hazards to navigation does help predict accident 
rates on the Lower Mississippi.  Some models are quite successful.  The 
allisions model, for instance, accounts for more than half of the variance in 
allisions with seven of the fourteen hazards to navigation.  Collisions are 
predicted by seven of these hazards, although less than half of the variance 
is explained (Table 2).   
 
Table 2.    
Models of Hazards to Navigation on Allision, Collsion,  
Grounding and All Accident Rates 










Narrow River  0.026 -0.069 .239** -0.047 
Blind Turn -0.026 0.221** .401** -0.036 
Floating Anchor-
ages 
-.138** -0.057 -.181** -.214** 
Barge Fleeting 
Areas 
.106** 0.178** .135* .283** 
Bridges .114* -0.093 -0.036 -0.018 
Waterway Junc-
tions 
0.009 .375** .415** .300** 
Shallow Channels .095* -.121* -0.054 -.129** 
Ferry Crossings .294** -.321** -0.095 0.081 
Dangerous Cur-
rents 
.452**    
Night Vision 
Problems 
0.002 -.133* -0.108 0.01 
Dangerous Docks -0.024 0.106 0.063 -0.031 
Congestion .317** .126* -.140* .351** 
Channel Crossings 0.016 -0.005 0.012 0.032 
R² (Adjusted R²) .717 
(.702)** 
.417 (.389)** .370 (.339)** .511 (.487)** 
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01 
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In the prediction of allision rates (adj. R² = 0.702), the model exhibits 
significant effects for dangerous currents, congestion, bridges, ferry cross-
ings, shallow channels, and barge fleeting areas in the expected direction.  
Floating anchorages appear to depress allision rates (Table 2).    
In Table 2, collision rates are predicted (adj. R² = 0.389) by barge 
fleeting areas, waterway junctions and blind turns.  But, shallow channels, 
ferry crossings and night vision problems exhibit negative effects. 
Grounding rates (Table 2) are predicted reasonably well (adj. R² = 
0.339).  Narrow river, blind turns, barge fleeting areas and waterway junc-
tions all have their expected effects.  Strangely, floating anchorages again 
predict fewer groundings as does congestion.  All-accident rates are pre-
dicted at an adjusted R² = .487, nearly half the variance.   All-accident 
rates, which include categories not specifically tested here as well, are pre-
dicted by barge fleeting areas, waterway junctions and congestion, in the 
expected directions.  Shallow channels have a significant negative effect.   
 
Table 3. 
Models of Hazards to Navigation on Tanker Accident Rates 
(Standardized Regression Coefficients) 
 








Narrow River -0.025 -0.036 -0.117* 0.033 
Blind Turn -0.033 -.271** -0.053 0.329** 
Floating Anchorages -0.12 -0.121 -0.186** -0.11 
Barge Fleeting Areas 0.023 .307** 0.288** .165** 
Bridges -0.053 -.182** -0.096 0.199** 
Waterway Junctions -0.055 -0.047 0.176** .411** 
Shallow Channels -0.055  0.133*  
Ferry Crossings -0.066 .245** 0.011 .155** 
Dangerous Currents     
Night Vision Prob-
lems 
0.052 0.083 0.053 -0.187** 
Dangerous Docks 0.089 0.002 -0.094 .142** 
Congestion  0.102 .198** 0.262** -.124* 
Channel Crossings .200* .161* 0.029 0.028 
Traffic .184* 0.062 .241** -.263** 
R² (Adjusted R²) .066 (.016) .296 (.261)** .348 (.313)** .462 (.435)** 
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01  
  
Dry-cargo ship accident rates (Table 3) are predicted by barge fleeting 
areas, waterway junctions, shallow channels, congestion and traffic.  A 
narrow river and floating anchorages tend to depress dry-cargo ship acci-
dent rates.  Less than half of the variance is explained (adj. R² = 0.313).  
Dry-cargo barge accident rates are predicted (adj. R² = 0.435) by blind 
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turns, barge fleeting areas, bridges, waterway junctions and ferry crossings, 
all in the expected direction, but are counter indicated by night vision prob-
lems, congestion and traffic.   
Tanker barge accident rates are predicted (adj. R² = 0.261) by barge 
fleeting areas, ferry crossings and congestion in the expected direction.  
Blind turns and bridges seem to depress the incidence of tanker barge acci-
dents.   Tanker ship accident rates is the worst model of vessel type acci-
dents (adj. R² = 0.016, not significant).  There are only significant effects 
for channel crossings and total traffic.   
This is a fairly impressive showing for the risk index, conceived as the 
combined effects of all known river hazards, and might be generally taken 
as strong support for the hypotheses of Forsyth, Gramling and Wooddell,23 
and regarding their risk index’s utility in prediction of vessel accidents. 
  
DISCUSSION 
Floating anchorages in this research seem to depress the incidence of 
every type of accident for which they have an effect.  This is a difficult 
finding to explain.  A closer look at the data, however, reveals that in every 
mile where there is a floating anchorage, there is also at least one barge 
fleeting area.  As a result, floating anchorages are treated mathematically 
as a subset of barge fleeting, a circumstance that complicates analysis.  
Still, the negative associations for floating anchorages remain a mystery, as 
does the occasional finding that a narrow river, blind turns, bridges, shal-
low channels, ferry crossings, night vision problems, congestion and traffic 
make the River safer.  The authors consulted with field informants, includ-
ing Robert Ross, Chief of the Office of Vessel Traffic Management, 
United States Coast Guard, who suggested that when pilots approach 
widely known hazards, their level of alert (“pucker factor,” as Ross called 
it) rises.  This extra care, coupled with mitigation by the Coast Guard and 
the Corps of Engineers, might account for these unexpected negative ef-
fects.  Other informants also suggested that generally agreed upon problem 
areas tended to raise stress levels and resulted in greater caution.  This 
tends to support the idea that stress and the resulting greater caution, at 
least under some circumstances, may reduce risk.24 
  
 23. Oil Spill, supra n. 14; Barge Traffic, supra n. 14; Expert Informants, supra n. 14. 
 24. Todd LaPorte, High Reliability Organizations: Unlikely, Demanding, and At Risk, 4(2) J. of 
Contingencies and Crisis Mgt. 60 (1996). 
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These models do not fit tanker ship accident rates very well, partly be-
cause the sample size is the smallest for tanker ships.  Examining the data 
for other reasons, however, reveals another interesting potential explana-
tion.  Tanker ship accidents, it turns out by reference to charts, seem to be 
clustered around tanker ship docks, particularly international tanker ship 
docks.  Our data table does not distinguish between types of docks.  But 
some of the most accident prone miles (232 and 118) are the locations of 
international tanker ship docks.  Not only are these docks dangerous be-
cause they are crowded, but also because they draw a number of non-U.S.-
flagged tanker ships, the most dangerous kind.  Future research should 
categorize docks, if at all possible.  
When more data become available, important sub-divisions of ship 
type by accident type rates might also be tested.  The current data will not 
support categorization into sub divisions such as “tanker barge collisions” 
because of the small samples such subdivisions produce. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This index, as validated by its general effectiveness at predicting the 
location of actual vessel accidents, will be quite useful in various decision-
making endeavors.  Coast Guard officials, response crews, insurance bro-
kers and local governments near or on waterways may want to take note of 
the predictive power demonstrated here.  For those interested in developing 
techniques by which major but rare disasters might be predicted, this test 
demonstrates the utility of developing such predictions of risk by using 
expert informants and analyzing data that include all incidents, thus over-
coming the problems associated with low-probability high-consequence 
events. 
The data analysis also suggests possible practical solutions to potential 
accidents.  Blind turns, barge fleeting areas, waterway junctions, and con-
gestion are consistent predictors of at least some types of accidents.  These 
factors inhibit the ability of pilots to know what is happening with other 
vessels around them.  Having numerous vessels around, being unable to 
see what is coming around a turn or out of a waterway, or being in a fleet-
ing area creates confusion.  A way to address these types of issues is with a 
vessel traffic monitoring system.  These systems consist of a transponder 
on each vessel similar to those on commercial airplanes, and a monitor that 
displays the position of other transponders in the area, similar to what an 
air traffic controller sees.  Transponders vary with vessel types.  Thus, so-
phisticated systems can monitor the types, travel direction and speed of 
vessels and display all of this to each vessel pilot.  The Coast Guard has 
wanted to do this on the lower Mississippi River for some time, and it was 
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a topic of conversation in many of our interviews.  A vessel traffic moni-
toring system would require owners to purchase equipment for each vessel 
and the Coast Guard to implement an expensive overarching system.  
Owners have resisted this expense, and congressional budgetary focus ap-
pears to date to be on more politically strategic issues than marine safety.  
It will be interesting to see if marine safety in general receives more atten-
tion as a result of the recent focus on terrorism and on ports and marine 
traffic as vulnerable areas.  Pennsylvania is at least studying monitoring 
cargo from the port of origin, through ports in Pennsylvania, and then con-
tainers as they are unloaded and trucked across the country.25  This type of 
attention might well mitigate some of the factors that make marine trans-
portation problematic. 
Although we have focused our attention here on river characteristics 
and the suggestion to reduce risk (a vessel traffic monitoring system) is a 
means to compensate for river conditions, we do not mean to detract from 
the ongoing focus of other researchers on vessel characteristics.  The prob-
lems noted by such investigators are real and, though not rigorously tested 
by statistical means, do seem quite reliable as predictors of which vessels 
are more prone to accidents.  It is also possible to take risk reduction ac-
tions based on these on-board characteristics.  One of our informants stated 
that incidents like the Bright Field allision26 could be largely prevented by 
not allowing flag of convenience ships (an on-board characteristic) into the 
river until they are inspected.  This same informant acknowledged that 
pressure against such inspections would be intense from a variety of stake-
holders.  Indeed, much more sophisticated models for assessing vessel on-
board potential accident risk have been developed27 and research on, and 
implementation of, both of these approaches should be encouraged given 
the “risk inducing”28 nature of marine transportation.  Marine transporta-
tion problems are not going away.  The Bright Field has changed only its 
name, being re-christened the Bright Star.  Similarly, the Exxon Valdez 
was renamed the Exxon Mediterranean.  Both actions are part of a process 
that makes testing of vessel characteristic hypotheses even more problem-
atic.29 
  
 25. Interview by Jim Lehrer with Earl Freilino (Nov. 14, 2002) (television broadcast). 
 26. The Bright Field lost power because the number one oil pump for the engine failed.  With a loss 
of oil pressure the engine automatically shut down to avoid engine damage.  The switch that would 
switch to the number two oil pump was not operable.  The log of the vessel indicated a long history of 
problems with the vessel’s engine.  The National Transportation Safety Board accident report found the 
probable cause of the accident was the failure of the vessel’s owners to adequate maintain the vessel’s 
engineering plant.   
 27. Herman, supra n. 13.   
 28. Perrow, supra n. 3. 
 29. Renaming vessels following high profile accidents is quite common. 
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